Security key allow-list builder
Decide which FIDO security keys you accept, with a reason for every model. The FIDO Metadata Service describes authenticator models, certified or not, the way their vendors declare them. Choose what the keys are for, set the criteria and see what each one removes.
Choose a starting point
FIDO MDS serial 303, 544 entries, 508 of them FIDO2 or U2F, last change 2026-11-18, next update due by 2026-12-01. The copy this page ships with.
508 statements on the list of 508. A key with a FIDO2 and a U2F statement counts twice.
- FIDO2 372by AAGUID
- U2F 136by key ID
- Nothing is removed.
Certification
What the FIDO Alliance itself records about the model. Everything below narrows this by what vendors declare.
nothing switched on
Security notices
Remove models FIDO warns about.
Remove models with a report of
FIDO certification
The lowest FIDO level you accept.
Certification profile
Certified for consumers or for enterprises.
FIPS 140
FIPS 140 validation.
Kind of device
Separates security keys from phones, laptops and apps.
nothing switched on
Statement type
FIDO2 statements, U2F statements or both.
Keep
Internal authenticators
Remove platform authenticators, the ones inside phones and laptops.
Phone-style verification
Remove models that check a face, an eye or a location.
Remove models that can verify the user by
Connection
How the key reaches the computer or phone.
nothing switched on
Connection
Keep keys with at least one of these.
Keep models with at least one of
Exact transport values
Remove exact transport lists, like a spreadsheet filter.
Remove models whose connection list is exactly
Key protection and proof
How keys are stored and how the model proves what it is.
nothing switched on
Key storage
Where the private keys live.
PIN and fingerprint check
Where the key compares them.
Attestation by model
The key can prove which model it is.
Trust anchor
A certificate to verify that proof against. An expired one still counts; the list marks those models.
Device-bound keys only
Keys never leave the device.
Cryptographic strength
Claimed security strength in bits. Models that do not report it are removed.
Passkey features
What the key reports about itself. Only FIDO2 statements carry this.
nothing switched on
CTAP version
The protocol version the key speaks.
Passkeys (discoverable credentials)
The key stores the passkey itself.
PIN or fingerprint on the key
The key checks a PIN or a fingerprint.
Minimum PIN length
The shortest PIN the key accepts. Models that do not report it are removed.
Passkey slots
How many passkeys fit on the key. Models that do not report it are removed.
Key capabilities
Capabilities the key reports as switched on.
Keep models that report all of
Extensions
Extensions the key supports.
Keep models that support all of
Signature algorithms
Signature algorithms the key offers.
Keep models that offer at least one of
Decided by hand
Whole makers or single models, added or removed by the starting point or by you.
nothing switched on
Makers on the list
Select which makers can qualify.
The maker is inferred from the model name. Your selection applies when you change criteria or load newer metadata.
Added or removed by hand
Individual model overrides take precedence over the criteria.
Share the filter set
A link or a file holds every setting. Whoever opens it sees the same list and can compare it with their own.
Take the list
372 AAGUIDs and 136 U2F entries with their key IDs.
The MDS file in use
BLOB serial 303 with 544 entries: 372 FIDO2, 136 U2F and 36 UAF, which WebAuthn cannot use. This is the copy the debugger ships with.
The selection logic
As a table for a ticket, or as a script that applies the same criteria to a BLOB you download yourself and writes allow-list.json.
# Everything in the MDS FIDO Metadata Service BLOB serial 303 (544 entries). Selection built with https://www.passkeys-debugger.io/mds-explorer. | # | Criterion | Setting | MDS field | Source | Removed | Left | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | 0 | All FIDO2 and U2F statements | | `entries[]` | | | 508 | Source: FIDO's record is what the FIDO Alliance itself states (status and certification reports). A vendor's declaration and the device's report come from the vendor's metadata statement; FIDO does not confirm each value. Result: 372 FIDO2 statements (matched by `aaguid`) and 136 U2F statements (matched by `attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers`).
Settle two lists that do not match
Two people filter the same file and end up with different counts. Comparing totals does not find the reason. These steps do.
Step 1
Use the same file
Different serial numbers give different counts before any criterion differs. The serial is shown above the criteria; both sides load the same blob.jwt with Use your own blob.jwt.
Step 2
Paste the other list
Build your side with the criteria. Then choose Compare with another list and paste the other side's AAGUIDs and key IDs, straight from their spreadsheet.
Step 3
Read the cause, not the total
For every entry only they keep, the page names your criterion that removes it. Two lists of the same length can share far fewer entries.
Step 4
Rebuild their rules if you know them
Start B as a copy and set their rules. A spreadsheet filter on the transports column is Exact transport values. A rule for FIDO2 only gets Apply this criterion to: FIDO2 only.
Step 5
Decide per criterion, then export
Agree on each differing criterion, add single keys by hand where the metadata is incomplete, and hand the script to whoever maintains the list.
What the metadata can and cannot tell you
Every criterion reads fields that vendors fill in. Most of these limits are named by the standard itself; each one links to the place that says so.
One key can be in the MDS twice
A FIDO2 statement is found by the AAGUID in the registration. A U2F statement has no AAGUID: the registration carries zeros, and the server finds the model by the key ID of the attestation certificate. The same key answers one way or the other, depending on the browser and on whether a PIN is set. A list for a second factor that only holds AAGUIDs turns away keys that are on it.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Service v3.1.1
attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiersCertified does not mean security key
Windows Hello, phones and authenticator apps are FIDO certified too. The metadata has no field for the kind of product. Platform authenticators can be removed by their own flag and transports. A phone app that declares an external connection and hardware key protection looks like a key in those fields. What gives it away is how it checks the user, which is what the criterion Phone-style verification reads. The few entries no field catches are removed by hand, and the page shows them.
In the standardFIDO Registry of Predefined Values v2.3
userVerificationDetailsConnections are often missing and only hints
The connection list comes from what the key reports about itself, and many statements leave it out. The attachment hint is only required from CTAP 2.2 on. The attachment hint is described by the standard as a hint that cannot be relied on as authoritative. A filter on connections removes real keys whose vendor filled in less. Review what it removes before the list goes live.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Statement v3.1.1
attachmentHintThe newest status report is the current status
An entry keeps its history: certified, then perhaps a security notice, then an update. A notice names the affected firmware. A later update raises the lowest trusted firmware version in the statement, and keys still on older firmware stay affected. A server that only reads the AAGUID cannot tell the two apart.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Service v3.1.1
statusReports[]Certification does not cover synced keys
FIDO certification of an authenticator does not cover the security of keys that leave the device. A statement says whether keys stay on the device, are marked per key with the backup flag or may always be backed up. Without the field the standard assumes they stay.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Statement v3.1.1
multiDeviceCredentialSupportWhat a key declares about itself is not verified
FIPS or FIDO levels inside the key's own report are the vendor's statement. FIDO says it does not verify them. The authoritative certification is the status report of the entry.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Statement v3.1.1
authenticatorGetInfoAn allow-list only works with attestation
The server has to ask for attestation and verify it against the root certificates in the entry. Without that, the AAGUID is a number the client sent. A key that only offers self attestation cannot prove its model.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Statement v3.1.1
attestationRootCertificatesThe file changes
FIDO recommends checking for a new BLOB once a day. The serial number goes up by one with every change, entries can disappear, and the next update date in the file is being retired. Two people who compare lists need the same serial first. Keep the filter set, not the list, and run it again on each new file.
In the standardFIDO Metadata Service v3.1.1
no, nextUpdate
The metadata and the standards belong to the FIDO Alliance, the only authoritative source for both. Read here: FIDO Metadata Statement v3.1.1, FIDO Metadata Service v3.1.1, FIDO Registry of Predefined Values v2.3. This page is not an official FIDO tool.
Then test a real key
A list is a claim until a key registers against it. The debugger runs the registration with the options each use needs and shows the AAGUID, the attestation format and the result of the MDS check.
Second factor
Discoverable credential and user verification discouraged, cross-platform attachment, direct attestation. The response is packed or fido-u2f.
Start the second factor testPasskey on a security key
Discoverable credential and user verification required, cross-platform attachment, direct attestation. The key asks for its PIN or a fingerprint.
Start the security key testQuestions about the MDS and allow-lists
- What is the FIDO Metadata Service?
- A signed file from the FIDO Alliance, the MDS BLOB, with one entry per authenticator model: its AAGUID or attestation certificate key IDs, certification status, capabilities and the root certificates to verify its attestation. A server uses it to decide which models it accepts. The FIDO Alliance publishes and owns the metadata. This page works on a copy of it and is not an official FIDO tool.FIDO Metadata ServiceFIDO's terms for the metadata
- Is a credential on a security key a passkey?
- Only if it is discoverable: the key stores it, and the user signs in without typing a username. A security key used as a second factor after the password holds a non-discoverable credential, which is not a passkey. The two uses need different criteria, so the builder has a starting point for each.
- Should a bank require FIDO certification level 2?
- It depends on what the keys protect and who pays for them. Level 2 removes more than half of the certified security keys, among them widely sold models certified at level 1. Compare both settings here before deciding: the difference is a list of real products.
- Why do two people get different lists from the same MDS file?
- Usually for one of four reasons: a different BLOB serial, a filter on exact transport values that drops NFC-only or Bluetooth-only keys, entries without a transport list, or U2F statements filtered differently from FIDO2 statements. The compare view shows which one it is.
- Does the builder send my filter set anywhere?
- No. The list is computed in your browser, and a BLOB you load is read there too. A shared link carries the filter set in the part after the # sign, which browsers do not send to a server, and the page takes it out of the address bar as soon as it has read it. Like the rest of this site, the page loads analytics and marketing tags.
- Can I use the exported list as it is?
- Use it as a starting point, never as the source. The only authoritative source is the FIDO Alliance: its current BLOB and its specifications. Download the BLOB from FIDO yourself, verify its signature in your server, run the exported script on it and review what the connection and phone-style verification criteria removed and what was decided by hand.How to get the BLOB from FIDO
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